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Abstract. That parthood is a transitive relation is among the most basic principles of classi-
cal mereology. Alas, it is also very controversial. In a recent paper, Ingvar Johansson has 
put forward a novel diagnosis of the problem, along with a corresponding solution. The di-
agnosis is on the right track, I argue, but the solution is misleading. And once the pieces are 
properly put together, we end up with a reinforcement of the standard defense of transitivity 
on behalf of classical mereology. 
 
 
1. Is parthood transitive? Classical mereology says it is. If x is part of y and y 
is part of z, then x is part of z—no matter what x, y, and z are. Indeed, on 
standard models of extensional mereology, parthood is isomorphic to set in-
clusion, and there is no question that the latter relation is transitive. Nonethe-
less, an increasing number of authors have been protesting that many legiti-
mate senses of ‘part’ appear to violate this principle. Typical examples 
would include:  
(1)  The handle is part of the door, which in turn is part of a house, but the handle 
itself is not part of the house. 
(2)  The nucleus of a cell is not a part of the organ of which that cell is part. 
(3)  An arm may be part of a musician who is part of an orchestra, yet no arm is 
part of an orchestra.  
(See [11, 7, 9], respectively). Authors who find such examples convincing 
have offered various accounts of the underlying phenomena. For example, it 
has been suggested that ‘part’ is context-sensitive [3], or that transitivity 
only holds relative to certain conditions [8], or that there really are several 
meronymic relations, only some of which are transitive [5], or again that 
each such relation can be meaningfully (and transitively) predicated only 
relative to entities of a restricted sort, such as individuals, groups, quantities, 
etc. [10, 14]. One way or the other, the failure of transitivity as a general 
part-whole principle would appear to have important philosophical ramifica-
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tions. Among other things, it would be detrimental to the claim, familiar 
from the philosophical literature, that the parthood relation modeled by clas-
sical mereology is truly governed by formal ontological principles, i.e., prin-
ciples that are metaphysically neutral and domain-independent and, there-
fore, realized or exemplified by any entities whatsoever.  
There is, however, a standard way of resisting such conclusions on be-
half of classical mereology [12, 2]. Broadly speaking, the reply moves from 
the consideration that the putative counterexamples stem from the implicit 
narrowness with which we may be inclined to use the relational predicate 
‘part’ in ordinary discourse. What counts as a functional part of a door—the 
handle—may not count as a functional part of the house, but that is not to 
say that it is not part of the house at all. On the contrary, it has all those fea-
tures that a genuine part is supposed to have: the handle contributes to the 
mass and shape of the whole house, it occupies part of the space occupied by 
the house, it gets annihilated if the house is annihilated, and if it gets annihi-
lated the house itself changes (albeit insignificantly). Similarly, if there is a 
sense of ‘part’ in which the musician’s arm is not part of the orchestra, or a 
biological subunit part of the organ to which it belongs, it is a narrow sense: 
the arm is not directly part of the orchestra, though it is directly part of a 
body that is directly part of the orchestra; biologically the nucleus is not a 
distinguished part of the organ, though it is a distinguished part of the cell 
and the cell a distinguished part of the organ. It is obvious that if the inter-
pretation of ‘part’ is narrowed by additional conditions (e.g., by requiring 
that parts make a functional, direct, or otherwise distinguished contribution 
to the whole), then transitivity may fail. In general, if x is a φ-part of y and y 
is a φ-part of z, x need not be a φ-part of z: the predicate modifier ‘φ’ may 
not distribute over parthood. But that shows the non-transitivity of ‘φ-part’, 
not of ‘part’, regardless of whether ‘φ’ is explicitly mentioned in our state-
ments and regardless of whether the corresponding relation can be treated as 
a significant case of meronymy. (It may also be that different narrowing 
conditions are operating within the same context: obviously the fact that the 
heart is a distinguished part of a musician, and the musician a direct part of 
an orchestra, does not imply that the heart is in any of these senses part of 
the orchestra.) 
Now, I for one have always found this reply perfectly satisfactory, and I 
wouldn’t feel the need to say anything more in its support. In a recent, in-
formed discussion of the problem, however, Ingvar Johansson [6] raises a 
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novel challenge. He objects to the anti-transitivity accounts mentioned 
above, but he also objects to the reply just outlined insofar as it would give 
rise to an “odd subsumption relation”:  
What is true of ‘red’ is necessarily also true of the ‘light red’ which it sub-
sumes, what is true of ‘running’ is necessarily also true of ‘running quickly’, 
and what is true of ‘x is part of y’ ought necessarily [to] be true of ‘x is a 
φ-part of y’. Since ‘x is part of y’ is transitive, ‘x is a φ-part of y’ ought to be 
so as well. (p. 165; notation adapted) 
This objection, I think, misfires, but it is worth explaining why. In addition, 
it is worth looking into Johansson’s own positive account of the matter. For 
the account itself may seem to offer what everybody is looking for: on the 
one hand, Johansson reads (1)–(3) and the like as involving truly non-
transitive parthood predicates; on the other, he analyses such predicates as 
involving a departure from the scope of classical mereology: 
There are both intransitive and non-transitive parthood predicates, but […] 
when examined more closely, these predicates are at least as complex as so-
called relative products of other binary relational predicates or as ternary 
predicates. Only truly binary parthood relations are necessarily transitive. 
(p. 162) 
I think this account is flawed, too, though it involves a kernel of truth that 
deserves some consideration. 
2. Here is why the objection misfires. There is, to be sure, something per-
fectly intuitive in the general subsumption principle that Johansson is as-
suming: 
(4) When a concept is more specific than some other concept, it inherits the prop-
erties of the more general one 
(from [1], p. 5). However, it is obvious that a lot depends on how exactly 
this principle is cashed out, and no reasonable way of doing so justifies the 
charge that parthood and φ-parthood behave oddly. 
For one thing, the relevant notion of property must be robust, i.e., (4) 
cannot be taken to imply that whatever is true of a general concept must be 
true of the more specific one. Surely, if it is true that ‘red’ stands for a color, 
then ‘light red’ must stand for a color, too. But although ‘red’ can properly 
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be predicated of the wine in this glass, the same is not true of ‘light red’. 
And although ‘red’ is more general than ‘light red’, the same cannot be true 
of ‘light red’ itself. 
Second, and more to the point, one must distinguish between the prop-
erties of a concept as such and the properties of those entities that fall under 
the concept. Plainly, (4) must hold in regard to the second sort of property: 
if every red object happens to be round, for instance, then a fortiori every 
light-red object is round. It is equally apparent, however, that (4) may fail in 
regard to the first sort of property: ‘red’ subsumes ‘dark red’ but ‘light red’ 
does not; ‘tall’ is vague but ‘one meter tall’ is not; ‘square’ is consistent but 
‘round square’ is not. In particular, it is clear that when it comes to relational 
concepts, greater specificity may come at a cost: a relation may be closed 
under properties that its subrelations fail to inherit, owing to the lack of suit-
able relata. Functionality (for example) is necessarily inherited, but reflexiv-
ity, symmetry, transitivity, connectedness, density, etc. are not. Thus, either 
we give up (4) or else we say (correctly, I think, and in agreement with stan-
dard practice) that this principle is meant to apply, not to the properties of 
the concepts themselves, but to those properties that are characteristic of the 
items in their extensions.  
So, now, what about the case at issue? Does the standard line of de-
fense on behalf of mereology violate the subsumption principle (4)? It does 
not. It says that φ-parthood is more specific than parthood, i.e., that ‘φ’ is a 
predicate modifier with the effect of narrowing the extension of ‘part’, and 
pretty clearly any property that is true of each ordered pair in the original 
extension is going to remain true of those pairs that survive the narrowing. 
Thus, (4) is trivially satisfied for every such property, regardless of the par-
ticular value of ‘φ’. On the other hand, precisely because of the narrowing, 
the transitivity of parthood need not be inherited by φ-parthood, but we have 
just seen that this is not the sort of property that can plausibly be said to fall 
within the scope of (4). Hence, no oddness follows from this fact, except of 
course that it would be a mistake to ignore the narrowing and identify φ-
parthood with parthood simpliciter, or with ψ-parthood for a different condi-
tion ‘ψ’. Besides, it would be remarkable indeed if things were otherwise. 
For by the same pattern one could argue that there is an “odd subsumption 
relation” linking (for example) parthood and proper parthood: the former is 
reflexive, the latter isn’t; yet the former is more general than the latter. 
Surely that would be a poor argument against the thought that the modifier 
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‘proper’ in ‘proper part’ yields a narrower interpretation of the general, re-
flexive predicate axiomatized by classical mereology. 
3. So I think that Johansson’s objection misfires. Nonetheless, I agree that 
more could (and should) be said about the sort of “narrowing” that is at issue 
in the putative counterexamples. Standardly, a predicate modifier is just an-
other predicate. A male parent is someone who is both a parent and male; 
a blue shirt is something that is both a shirt and blue. It is well known, 
however, that not every predicate modifier can be analyzed along these stan-
dard lines: a fake diamond is not a diamond, an alleged thief need not be 
a thief, and a good pianist need only be good qua pianist. (See [4] for an 
overview.) In fact, even the examples used by Johansson seem to run afoul 
of the standard cases: a light red object may be darker than a dark yellow 
one, and someone may be running quickly while journeying slowly. So how 
exactly is the relevant predicate modifier to be handled when it comes to the 
various cases of φ-parthood exhibited by the putative counterexamples to 
transitivity?  
Clearly, ‘φ’ cannot be an irregular modifier, like ‘fake’ or ‘alleged’, 
otherwise φ-parthood would not qualify as a specification of parthood. But 
‘φ’ cannot be just a regular modifier either, like ‘male’ or ‘blue’. For then 
the standard conjunctive analysis would go through, and on such an analysis 
transitivity would have to hold. If ‘x is a φ-part of y’ meant ‘x is part of y and 
x is φ’, then the relevant transitivity statement would have the form: 
(5) (Pxy & φx) & (Pyz & φy) → (Pxz & φx), 
and surely this statement is a logical consequence of the transitivity of ‘P’, 
parthood: 
(6) Pxy & Pyz → Pxz. 
So what sort of modification do we have in cases such as (1)–(3) and the 
like? Here is where Johansson’s positive account comes into the picture.  
With reference to the example in (1), Johansson offers the following 
analysis. When we assert that a handle, x, is a functional part of a door, y, we 
mean to assert that x is part of y and that there is a z (the door’s panel) such 
that acting on x makes something happen to z that is relevant for x’s function 
in relation to y (such as opening and closing y). Modulo minor details, this 
strikes me as right on target. The modifier ‘functional’ does not attribute a 
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monadic property, like ‘male’ or ‘blue’; it attributes a relational property. 
And this relational property, F, need not itself be transitive: x may be F-
related to y and y to z, but there is no guarantee that x is F-related to z.  
Of course this is just the beginning. The “minor details” I mentioned 
concern questions such as the following:  
(i) Should this account require that y be a functional unity or an integral object of 
some kind? (Johansson thinks so, for otherwise we would get the odd result 
that the handle is a functional part of the whole solar system, but I am not sure 
this is right: on the one hand, the handle does not have any function in relation 
to the solar system; on the other, it seems to me that the solar system is an in-
tegral or functional whole anyhow.)  
(ii) Should we require that x be always in contact with z? (Johansson says so, but I 
am inclined to disagree: presumably my mouse is a functional part of my 
computer, even though it is wireless and, therefore, spatially disconnected 
from the rest.)  
(iii) Should we require that z be always a third entity, distinct from x and y? (My 
understanding is that Johansson would think so, and surely this seems right in 
the door handle case. But what about the handle of a walking cane, for exam-
ple: isn’t that a case in which z = y? Or consider the door panel: arguably, that 
is a functional part of the door, too. And doesn’t pushing the panel—at least in 
some cases, as with ordinary grocery-store doors—make something happen to 
the panel itself that is relevant to its function in relation to the door, i.e., isn’t 
that a case where z = x?)  
These are not easy questions to answer, especially in the absence of a sub-
stantive theory of what functionality amounts to (by itself a challenging task; 
see for instance [13]). But never mind that. At least as a first approxima-
tion, it certainly seems to me that the account is on the right track: in cases 
such as (1), the implicit predicate modifier does not attribute a monadic 
property to the part; it attributes a relational property to the part-whole pair. 
And this should suffice to dispel once and for all the confusion surrounding 
the transitivity issue—as a clarification of the standard account, not as an 
alternative.  
Unfortunately, Johansson does not think so. He regards the analysis just 
outlined as involving a major deviation from the standard account. For he 
maintains that the analysis brings out an important feature of functional 
parthood that has hitherto been neglected, and according to Johansson it is 
precisely the failure to appreciate that feature that explains the confusion: 
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When we claim that a handle (x) is a functional part of a door (y), we seem to 
be using a binary relational predicate. In fact, however, we are using a predi-
cate that contains a relative product and that, therefore, involves at least three 
relata (x, y, and z). And the same applies to the door-to-house case, too. […] 
The sentences ‘The handle is a functional part of the door’ and ‘The door is a 
functional part of the house’ fall outside mereology as the theory of the binary 
parthood relation. (p. 173) 
This strikes me as both incorrect (in the diagnosis) and independently con-
fusing (in the verdict).  
First of all, standardly a relative product of two relations R and S (also 
known as composition) is defined as follows: 
(7) R/Sxy =df ∃z(Rxz & Szy). 
In other words, the tie between the two relata is guaranteed by a third, mid-
dle term. The relational predicate ‘aunt’ is in this sense a relative product of 
the predicates ‘sister’ and ‘parent’. But surely ‘functional part’ does not, on 
the proposed analysis, have this form. Let ‘Mxyz’ abbreviate the predicate 
‘x makes something happen to z that is relevant for x’s function in relation 
to y’, and define 
(8) Fxy =df ∃z(Mxyz). 
Then the analysis of ‘x is a functional part of y’ amounts to the following: 
(9) FPxy =df Pxy & Fxy. 
And this is not a relative product, not even a “qualified” relative product 
(i.e., a product involving further qualifications on the middle term). It is just 
a conjunctive predicate. Johansson is right in pointing out that ‘F’ involves 
“a hidden and indefinite reference to a third relatum” (p. 171), namely, the 
door panel. But pace Johansson, this third relatum does not act as a middle 
term; it is just an item that needs to be mentioned in the explicit definition of 
‘F’. Moreover, the relatum in question is bound by a quantifier, so obviously 
its showing up in (8) does not affect the number of arguments of the de-
finiendum, which is perfectly binary. This is true also of binary products, of 
course: the definiens in (7) involves three variables; but the third variable, z, 
is bound, so we end up with a relation of the same arity as R and S.  
Accordingly—and this is the confusing bit—Johansson cannot go on to 
say that ‘functional part’ picks out a qualified relative product which, as 
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such, is akin to a ternary relation (p. 172). Whether or not we think of it as a 
product, ‘F’ is just as binary as ‘P’, hence we cannot conclude that the puta-
tive counterexample to transitivity exhibited by (1) founders because of the 
peculiar nature of the relevant relation—a relation that involves “at least 
three relata … not just two, as in the parthood relation of mereology” (p. 
170). It founders because the logical form of (1) does not correspond to the 
transitivity axiom, (6), but to the conditional 
(10) (Pxy & Fxy) & (Pyz & Fyz) → (Pxz & Fxz). 
And this conditional, unlike (5), is logically independent of (6) and of the 
other axioms of mereology. 
4. My conclusion is therefore twofold. Not only does Johansson’s objection 
to the standard account misfire. His own account is incorrect, too—and mis-
leading. It is incorrect and misleading in spite of the correct and fitting intui-
tion on which it rests. Of course, I have only illustrated these claims in con-
nection with (1), but I would argue that similar considerations apply to Jo-
hansson’s treatment of the other putative counterexamples to transitivity. In 
his paper he offers a thorough analysis of such predicates as ‘direct part’, 
‘distinguished part’, etc., each of which involves its own subtleties. I leave 
the details to the interested reader. For what it’s worth, my assessment is the 
same in each case. The basic analysis is correct, but the ensuing picture is 
defective. And once the picture is fixed along the lines illustrated above, we 
do not end up with an alternative account of the matter; we just have a more 
careful, accurate formulation of the standard account on behalf of classi-
cal mereology. Parthood is transitive; φ-parthood—for many values of ‘φ’—
is not. 
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